



































(I) The	laws	of	physics	are	space-time	invariant.		(II) The	chance	of	an	event	is	determined	by	the	physical	laws	and	local					qualitative	circumstances.	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	Therefore,		(IP')		 	Two	events	that	differ	at	most	in	where	and	when	they	hypothetically	occur	(and	perhaps	in	matters	of	bare	identity	but	not	in	qualitative	features)	have	the	same	chance.		What	I	mean	by	(I)	is	just	that	the	laws	of	physics	are	the	same	in	every	place	at	every	time,	and	they	do	not	have	any	place-	or	time-dependent	features.		Whatever	the	laws	imply	about	the	outcome	of	an	experiment	is	the	same	no	matter	where	and	when	that	experiment	is	conducted,	other	things	being	equal.7		This	in	itself	does	not	imply	IP',	because	we	might	think	that	chances	



















particular	ticket.		It	may	be	tempting	to	object,	“How	can	the	probability	increase	for	the	set	of	remaining	tickets	if	it	does	not	increase	for	any	individual	ticket?”		But	that	objection	presupposes	countable	additivity,	or	something	like	it,	and	proponents	of	infinitesimal	probabilities	are	already	willing	to	sacrifice	countable	additivity	(e.g.,	Benci	et	al.	2013;	2016).			One	might	think	that	the	renormalization	step	is	justified	by	conditionalization,	as	Benci	et	al.’s	later	remarks	(2016,	19)	seem	to	suggest.		Let	T	be	the	event	that	ticket	t	is	chosen	in	situation	(1),	and	U	the	event	that	a	different	ticket	u	is	chosen.		Since	the	lottery	is	fair,	Prob(T)	=	Prob(U)	=	Prob(E1).		Now	suppose	that	ticket	t	is	the	one	removed	in	situation	(2).		If	we	therefore	assume	that	Prob(E2)	=	Prob(U|~T),	the	ratio	formula	for	conditional	probability	gives	us		 	 Prob(E2)	=	$%&'(,	&	~/)$%&'(~/) 	=	 $%&'(,)!"	$%&'(/)	=	 !!"	$%&'()*)	Prob(E1),				which	is	precisely	the	renormalization	step.		But	this	assumption	that	Prob(E2)	=	Prob(U|~T)	is	not	obviously	correct	either.		Conditional	probability	is	commonly	used	to	model	situations	where	we	have	obtained	some	information	about	an	outcome,	such	as	the	news	that	ticket	t	was	not	chosen.		It	is	also	used	to	model	cases	where	we	adopt	a	policy,	e.g.,	if	ticket	t	is	chosen,	ignore	it	and	repeat	the	experiment.		But	Benci	et	al.’s	case	is	neither	of	those.		It	is	a	case	where	





                                                        12	Benci	et	al.’s	renormalization	step	implies	that	the	probabilities	for	all	remaining	tickets	are	affected	equally,	i.e.,	multiplied	by	the	same	factor,	but	that	is	not	needed.		All	that	is	needed	to	complete	the	urn	argument	is	a	case	where	removing	a	ticket	multiplies	the	probability	for	some	particular	ticket	by	a	factor	other	than	one.	
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is	the	algebra	generated	by	the	cylinder	sets13	of	2N,	and	P	is	a	hyperreal-valued	probability	function	defined	on	F.		Williamson’s	event	H(1…)	is	then	modelled	as	the	set	{á1,	1,	1,… ñ}	and	H(2…)	as	the	set	{á1,	1,	1,… ñ,	á0,	1,	1,… ñ}.		Note	that	the	elements	of	an	“event”	in	probability	theory	represent	disjuncts	in	a	disjunctive	description.		The	sets	{á1,	1,	1,… ñ,	á0,	1,	1,… ñ},	for	example,	represents	the	disjunction	([H(1)	&	H(2)	&	H(3)	&…]	or	[T(1)	&	H(2)	&	H(3)	&	…]),	where	T(1),	of	course,	is	the	event	that	the	first	outcome	is	tails.		In	general,	two	collections	are	said	to	be	isomorphic	if	there	is	a	bijection	between	them	that	preserves	all	relevant	structure.		In	algebra,	for	example,	an	isomorphism	preserves	the	algebraic	relations	between	elements.		But	the	sets	{á1,	1,	1,… ñ}	and	{á1,	1,	1,… ñ,	á0,	1,	1,… ñ}	are	not	isomorphic	in	any	sense,	because	there	is	not	even	a	bijection	between	them.		Thus,	according	to	Howson,	Williamson’s	events	are	not	isomorphic,	so	his	argument	is	a	non-starter.		
3.2	Reply	What	Williamson	means	by	“isomorphic	events”	does	not	concern	“events”	in	the	jargon	of	probability	theory,	i.e.,	sets	in	the	algebra	of	a	probability	space,	but	physical	events,	in	the	ordinary	sense	of	things	that	happen,	or	things	that	might	happen.		As	we	saw,	Williamson	is	concerned	with	“the	physical	structure	of	the	set-up”	and	the	“qualitative	type”	of	events.		Moreover,	he	explains	what	he	means	by	‘isomorphic	events’	in	terms	of	a	structure	preserving	map,	not	between	subsets	of	the	sample	space,	but	between	“the	constituent	single-toss	events”	H(1),	H(2),	H(3),…	and	H(2),	H(3),	H(4),…	that	make	up	the	events	H(1…)	and	H(2…),	respectively.		While	Howson’s	“events”	are	effectively	sets	of	disjuncts,	Williamson’s	
                                                        13	A	cylinder	set	is	a	set	{ás1,	s2,… 	Î	2N:	si(1)	=	v1,	si(2)	=	v2,…,	si(n)	=	vn},	where	i(1),	i(2),…,	i(n),	v1,	v2,…,	vn,	n	Î	
N.		However,	the	assumption	that	F	is	an	algebra	generated	by	cylinder	sets	is	unnecessary	here.		If	we	are	willing	to	relinquish	the	possibility	of	translation	invariance,	as	Benci	et	al.	are,	we	can	define	P	on	the	entire	power	set	of	2N.		But	the	particular	domain	of	P	does	not	pear	on	Howson’s	objection	so	long	as	it	includes	{á1,	1,	1,… ñ}	and	{á1,	1,	1,… ñ,	á0,	1,	1,… ñ}.	
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lA(H(2…))	=	{á0,	1,	1,… ñ,	 á1,	1,	1,… ñ},
lB(H(2…))	=	{á1,	1,	1,… ñ}.		
Thus,	under	lA,	H(1…)	and	H(2…)	are	represented	by	the	same	sets	as	in	Howson’s	objection,	while	under	lB,	H(2…)	is	represented	by	{á1,	1,	1,… ñ}	and	H(1…)	has	no	representation	at	all.		Now	let	P:	2N	®	[0,	1]*	where	[0,	1]*	is	a	hyperreal	unit	interval,	and	for	any	physical	event	in	the	domain	of	lΦ,	for	Φ	=	A,	B,	let	ProbΦ(E)	=	P(lΦ(E)).		Hence,		



















                                                        18	Parker	2012	argues	contrapositively	from	the	assumption	of	regularity	to	the	failure	of	rotation	invariance,	but	again	it	is	explicitly	a	failure	of	rotation	invariance	for	a	single	probability	function.		Bernstein	and	Wattenberg	1969,	Barrett	2010,	and	Pruss	2013	also	discuss	invariance	for	a	single	probability	function.		Of	course,	Benci	et	al.	could	claim	that	these	are	all	careless	glosses,	but	there	is	no	need	for	such	accusations	if	the	arguments	are	taken	at	face	value.	
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4.	Next	moves	If,	as	I	have	argued,	Howson	and	Benci	et	al.’s	replies	fail	to	refute	these	three	arguments,	what	more	could	they	say	in	defense	of	regular	and	hyperreal	probabilities?	Howson	might	respond	by	pointing	to	a	merely	instrumental	role	for	hyperreal	probabilities.		He	writes,	
the	object	there	is	not	so	much,	or	at	all,	to	regard	hyperreal	probabilities	as	on	the	same	footing	as	real-valued	ones	but	to	use	the	nonstandard	universe	simply	as	an	aid	to	the	standard	theory	by	translating	standard	problems	into	nonstandard	ones	by	means	of	the	Transfer	Principle,	where	they	are	often	more	tractable….	(2016)		Consequently,	he	might	say,	proponents	of	hyperreal	probabilities	will	not	be	troubled	by	arguments	from	physical	principles.		However,	this	is	not	how	philosophers	typically	use	hyperreal	probabilities.		Hofweber	(2014),	crediting	Lewis	and	Skyrms,	defends	hyperreal	probabilities	on	semantic	grounds.		He	argues	that	a	chance	of	zero	just	means	no	chance	at	all,	and	if	something	has	no	chance	of	happening,	it	does	not	happen.		He	also	claims	that,	otherwise,	probability	would	lack	any	teeth.		For	such	reasons,	Lewis,	Skyrms,	and	Hofweber	accept	regularity	and	therefore	infinitesimal	chances.		They	do	not	use	infinitesimals	to	facilitate	calculations,	they	just	think	that	infinitesimals	correctly	represent	the	structure	of	chances	in	the	real	world.		Benci	et	al.,	on	the	other	hand,	champion	infinitesimal	probabilities	in	order	to	make	better	sense	of	what	they	consider	to	be	conceptually	possible	scenarios,	such	as	infinite	lotteries.		NAP	models,	they	argue,	have	theoretical	virtues	over	the	de	Finetti	(1974)	approach	to	infinite	lotteries	(which	is	essentially	just	to	drop	countable	additivity)	and	even	over	the	standard	treatment	of	continuous	sample	spaces.		To	an	extent,	the	possibility	of	calculation	is	one	of	their	concerns,	for	it	is	one	of	the	stated	motivations	for	their	generalized	continuity	axiom.		But	their	primary	motivation	is	not	to	simplify	calculations.		It	is	to	find	enlightening	models,	models	that	can	give	us	a	better	theoretical	handle	on	problematic	hypothetical	
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processes.		So	Howson’s	instrumentalist	view	of	hyperreals	is	not	in	line	with	the	philosophical	literature.	Still,	Benci	et	al.	seem	inclined	to	a	milder	pragmatism.		Some	of	their	discussion	suggests	a	general	antirealism	about	probability	models.		“[T]here	is	no	reason	to	assume,”	they	write,	“that	there	is	a	unique	best	way	to	model	certain	infinite	probabilistic	situations…”		Thus	they	might	counter	the	arguments	against	regularity	by	claiming	that,	even	if	the	space-time	invariance	of	probabilities	is	sometimes	mandated	by	plausible	or	useful	principles,	the	best	models	over	all	might	involve	an	infinitesimal	deviation	from	such	invariance.		Or	they	might	just	argue	that	it	is	useful	to	apply	various	models	to	a	given	process,	if	only	to	better	understand	the	space	of	possible	models	and	their	virtues	and	limitations.	Yet,	as	Benci	et	al.	themselves	point	out,	it	could	be	argued	that,	“There	is	such	a	thing	as	physical	chance.		And	it	is	a	legitimate	task	of	our	mathematical	models	to	track	this	property.”		Plausibly,	the	chances	for	a	given	experiment	have	a	definite	structure.		The	outcomes	in	any	sequence	of	die	rolls	or	coin	flips	exhibit	a	distinctive	and	robust	pattern,	largely	independent	of	the	detailed	circumstances	or	the	observer’s	conceptions.		It	is	one	of	the	main	goals	of	probability	theory	to	accurately	characterize	and	explain	such	patterns.		Benci	et	al.	respond	to	such	a	realist	viewpoint	as	follows:		
But	our	models	can	only	track	physical	chance	in	a	mediated	way.		In	order	to	describe	a	physical	system	and	its	behaviour,	our	probabilistic	models	have	to	select	a	sample	space	and	label	the	point	events	(that	is,	establish	a	connection	between	reality	and	point	events	in	the	model).		For	finite	sample	spaces,	the	labelling	does	not	matter;	but	for	infinite	sample	spaces,	different	labellings	can	result	in	different	probability	assignments.		All	this	induces	a	degree	of	relativity	in	probability	values	of	events.		(2016,	34)			Thus,	according	to	Benci	et	al.,	any	probability	model	with	an	infinite	sample	space	will	involve	some	arbitrariness,	whether	it	is	a	standard	Kolmogorovian	model	or	a	regular	one.		Their	main	concern	in	this	passage	is	arbitrariness	related	to	the	choice	of	labelling	and,	for	NAP	models,	the	choice	of	an	ultrafilter,	but	it	suggests	they	might	take	a	similarly	noncommittal	attitude	toward	the	choice	between	regular	and	space-time	invariant	models.			
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The	problem	with	such	a	stance	is	that	it	appears	incompatible	with	the	goal	of	accurately	modelling	physical	chances.		For	the	kinds	of	experiments	discussed	here,	a	model	cannot	be	both	regular	and	space-time	invariant.		If	our	goal	is	to	characterize	the	true	structure	of	the	chances	in	such	experiments,	we	should	take	into	account	whether	the	chances	are	truly	space-time	invariant	or	regular	(or	neither).		This	leaves	us	little	freedom	to	choose;	either	regular	models	are	accurate	or	they	are	not,	and	the	examples	discussed	here	give	us	some	reason	to	believe	that,	at	least	in	those	cases,	they	are	not.	This	brings	us	to	another	possible	position,	namely	that	of	a	moderate,	pluralistic	regularist	who	holds	that,	in	cases	where	there	is	a	strong	argument	from	IP	against	regularity,	the	latter	might	fail,	but	otherwise	it	should	hold.		However,	this	position	is	awkward,	especially	for	Benci	et	al..		Their	main	application	of	NAP	is	to	the	de	Finetti	lottery	with	an	infinite	number	of	tickets,	but	their	own	urn	argument	suggests	that	such	a	lottery	can	bring	regularity	into	conflict	with	IP	or	other	plausible	symmetry	assumptions,	provided	there	are	cases	where	something	like	their	renormalization	step	applies.		To	hold	this	pluralistic	regularist	position	would	mean	holding	that	infinite	lotteries	are	not	regular	when	the	specific	conditions	that	justify	such	a	renormalization	step	hold,	but	they	are	generally	regular	otherwise.		If	we	admit	that	regularity	is	false	for	certain	selection	mechanisms,	why	should	we	expect	it	to	hold	for	others?	We	can	make	this	point	more	concrete.		Suppose	we	have	a	lottery	machine	for	which	the	renormalization	step	is	valid,	and	suppose	the	moderate	regularist	admits	that	regularity	fails	for	this	lottery	machine.		Now	let	us	add	to	this	machine	a	component	that	detects	which	tickets	are	present	in	the	urn.		If	one	of	the	original	tickets	is	removed,	it	applies	a	different	selection	mechanism	for	which	no	such	renormalization	formula	applies.		For	this	composite	lottery	machine,	we	cannot	make	Benci	et	al.’s	urn	argument.		Will	the	moderate	regularist	then	claim	that	regularity	does	hold	for	the	composite	machine?		Surely,	if	the	composite	machine	applies	the	same	mechanism	as	the	original	machine	when	all	the	original	tickets	are	present,	then	in	that	case	it	produces	the	same	distribution	as	the	original	machine.		Thus,	such	opportunistic	
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regularism	is	in	general	untenable.		Similarly,	if	we	accept	that	there	are	realizations	of	the	circle	example	where	the	distribution	is	fully	rotation-symmetric	and	regularity	fails,	we	should	not	expect	that	regularity	holds	whenever	the	distribution	is	not	perfectly	symmetric.	What	this	illustrates	is	that,	if	indeed	we	are	concerned	with	accurately	modelling	the	structure	of	objective	chances,	then	the	question	of	regularity	turns	not	on	theoretical	virtues,	but	on	the	details	of	the	probabilistic	processes	under	study.		If	indeed	there	are	cases	where	regularity	does	not	hold,	then	(1)	there	is	no	sound	and	fully	general	argument	for	regularity,	and	(2)	regularity	is	not	needed	to	render	such	experiments	conceptually	coherent.		At	most,	regular	models	boast	certain	theoretical	virtues	while	lacking	others,	namely	those	of	permitting	invariance	under	various	transformations.		But	if	there	are	any	facts	about	the	structure	of	chances,	the	model	should	reflect	those	facts	first,	and	desirable	theoretical	virtues	only	as	accuracy	permits.		Of	course,	it	may	be	difficult	to	determine	what	the	most	accurate	model	is	in	any	particular	case,	but	if	we	have	good	reason	to	believe	that	chances	are	not	regular	in	certain	cases,	we	can	reasonably	hypothesize	that	they	are	not	regular	in	similar	cases	either.		
5.	Conclusion	We	have	reviewed	three	arguments	that	certain	hypothetical	experiments	exhibit	non-regular	probabilities.		If	these	arguments	succeed,	then	regularity	does	not	generally	hold,	and	there	is	little	reason	to	believe	that	it	typically	holds	for	other	experiments,	nor	that	we	should	demand	it	in	our	credences.		Howson	and	Benci	et	al.	have	attempted	to	refute	those	arguments,	but	their	refutations	fail.		Howson	points	out	that	Williamson’s	events	are	not	in	fact	isomorphic,	because	one	is	a	singleton	while	the	other	is	a	pair,	but	this	badly	misses	the	point.		Howson	is	speaking	of	the	abstract	“events”	of	mathematical	probability	theory,	which	are	sets,	while	Williamson	is	concerned	with	events	in	the	ordinary	sense	of	things	that	could	happen.		When	Williamson	says	that	his	two	coin	flip	sequences	are	isomorphic,	he	does	not	mean	that	they	are	subsets	of	a	sample	space	that	have	a	one-to-one	correspondence,	he	means	that	they	have	all	of	
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the	same	physical	qualitative	properties,	and	this	is	true	by	hypothesis.		Benci	et	al.	claim	that	Williamson	and	Parker	both	found	their	arguments	on	a	conflation	of	different	probability	models.		The	symmetries	between	Williamson’s	coin	flip	sequences	imply	that	they	can	be	assigned	the	same	probability	in	different	models,	but	not	that	they	must	have	the	same	probability	in	a	single	model,	and	likewise	for	Parker’s	point	sets.		But	neither	Williamson’s	nor	Parker’s	argument,	nor	even	Benci	et	al.’s	own,	is	in	fact	based	on	such	a	conflation	of	models.		Williamson’s	is	founded	on	the	principle	that	qualitatively	identical	events	in	qualitatively	identical	circumstances	should	have	the	same	probability,	and	Parker’s	is	based	on	the	plausibility	of	a	perfectly	symmetric	continuous	distribution.		Both	claim,	not	that	their	parallel	events	can	be	given	the	same	probability	in	different	models,	but	that	the	parallel	events	will	have	the	same	probability	in	any	one	model,	if	that	model	is	accurate.		This	is	no	mere	slip.	The	principle	underlying	the	circle	and	urn	arguments,	that	“isomorphic”	events	have	the	same	probability,	is	not	above	dispute,	but	we	have	provided	here	a	simple	argument	from	more	fundamental	hypotheses.		If	(I)	the	laws	of	nature	are	space-time	invariant,	and	(II)	chances	are	determined	by	local	qualitative	circumstances	and	natural	laws,	it	follows	that	qualitatively	identical	events	have	the	same	chance,	and	should	also	be	assigned	the	same	credence	insofar	as	rational	credences	track	chance.		One	who	insists	on	regularity	must	therefore	deny	either	the	space-time	invariance	of	laws	or	the	grounding	of	chance	in	qualitative	circumstances.	This	leaves	the	regularist	several	options,	including	at	least	the	following:		One	may	take	a	more	or	less	instrumentalist	view	that	is	more	concerned	with	the	theoretical	virtues	of	regular	probabilities	than	with	accurately	modelling	chances.		One	may	hold	that	regularity	fails	in	the	cases	discussed	but	is	still	plausible	in	other	cases,	though	we	have	seen	that	this	is	an	uncomfortable	position	to	hold.		Or,	one	might	simply	deny	IP,	as	well	as	the	very	possibility	of	a	symmetric	continuous	distribution.		Hofweber	(2014),	at	least,	prefers	the	latter	move,	and	denies	the	premise	supporting	IP	that	chances	are	determined	by	local	qualitative	circumstances.		But	if	regularity	requires	that	so-called	objective	chance	is	in	reality	such	a	
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contextual	matter,	or	that	the	laws	of	physics	are	not	in	fact	space-time	invariant,	then	the	arguments	for	regularity	should	be	regarded	very	skeptically.		
	
References	Appiah,	Anthony.	1985.	Assertion	and	conditionals.	New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press.	Barrett,	Martin.	2010.	The	possibility	of	infinitesimal	chances.	In	The	place	of	probability	in	
science,	eds.	Ellery	Eells	and	J.H.	Fetzer,	65-79.	Dordrecht:	Springer.	Benci,	Vieri.	1995.	I	numeri	e	gli	insiemi	etichettati.		Conferenze	del	seminario	di	matematica	dell’	
Universita’	di	Bari	261:	1–29.	Benci,	Vieri,	Emanuele	Bottazzi,	and	Mauro	Di	Nasso.	2014.	Elementary	numerosity	and	measures.	Journal	of	Logic	and	Analysis	6:	1–14.		Benci,	Vieri,	and	Maureo	Di	Nasso.	2003.	Numerosities	of	labeled	sets:	A	new	way	of	counting.	
Advances	in	Mathematics	173:	50–67.		Benci,	Vieri,	Leon	Horsten,	and	Sylvia	Wenmackers.	2013.		Non-Archimedean	Probability.	Milan	
Journal	of	Mathematics	81:	121–151.	----.	2016.	Infinitesimal	Probabilities.	British	Journal	for	the	Philosophy	of	Science.	https://doi:10.1093/bjps/axw013	Bernstein,	Allen	R.,	and	Frank	Wattenberg.	1969.	Non-standard	measure	theory.		In	Applications	
of	model	theory	of	algebra,	analysis,	and	probability,	Ed.	W.	A.	J.	Luxemburg,	171–85.	New	York:	Holt,	Rinehard	and	Winston.		Boddy,	Kimberly	K.,	Sean	Carroll,	and	Jason	S.	Pollack.	2016.	De	Sitter	space	without	dynamical	quantum	fluctuations.	Foundations	of	Physics	46:	702–735.	----.		2017.	Why	Boltzmann	brains	do	not	fluctuate	into	existence	in	the	De	Sitter	vacuum.	In	The	
philosophy	of	cosmology,	eds.	K.	Chamcham	et	al.,	288-240.	Cambridge:		Cambridge	University	Press.	Carnap,	Rudolf.	1950.	Logical	foundations	of	probability.	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press.				----.	1963.	Replies	and	systematic	expositions.	In	Schilpp	(1963),	859–1013.	
 27 
De	Finetti,	Bruno.	1964.	Foresight:	Its	logical	laws,	its	subjective	sources.	In	Studies	in	subjective	
probability,	eds.	H.	Kyburg	and	H.	Smokler,	93-158.	Huntington,	NY:	Krieger.	----.	1974.	Theory	of	probability,	Vols	1	and	2.	Trans.	A.	Machí	and	A.	Smith.	New	York:	Wiley.	Di	Nasso,	Mauro,	and	Marco	Forti.	2010.	Numerosities	of	point	sets	over	the	real	line.	
Transactions	of	the	American	Mathematical	Society	362:	5355–5371.		Edwards,	Ward,	Harold	Lindman,	and	Leonard	J.	Savage.	1963.	Bayesian	statistical	inference	for	psychological	research.	Psychological	Review	70:	193–242.	Hofweber,	Thomas.	2014.	Infinitesimal	chances.	Philosopher’s	Imprint	14:	1-34.	Howson,	Colin.	2017.	Regularity	and	infinitely	tossed	coins.	European	Journal	for	Philosophy	of	
Science	7:	97–102.		Jackson,	Frank.	1987.	Conditionals.	Oxford:	Blackwell.	Jeffrey,	Richard.	1992.		Probability	and	the	art	of	judgment.	Cambridge,	UK:	Cambridge	University	Press.	Jeffreys,	Harold.	1961.	Theory	of	probability,	3rd	Edition.	Oxford:	Clarendon	Press.	Kemeny,	John	G.	1955.	Fair	bets	and	inductive	probabilities.	Journal	of	Symbolic	Logic	20:	263–273.	----.	1963.	Carnap’s	theory	of	probability	and	induction.	In	Schilpp	(1963),	711–738.	Lewis,	David	K.	1980.	A	subjectivist’s	guide	to	objective	chance.		In	Studies	in	inductive	logic	and	
probability,	v.	II,	ed.	R.C.	Jeffrey,	263-293.	Berkeley	and	Los	Angeles:	University	of	California	Press.	----.	1994.	Humean	supervenience	debugged.	Mind	103:	473–490.		Parker,	Matthew	W.	2012.	More	trouble	for	regular	probabilities.	PhilSci	Archive,	http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13063	----.	2013.	Set	size	and	the	part–whole	principle.	Review	of	Symbolic	Logic	6:	589-612.	Pruss,	Alexander.	2013.	Null	probability,	dominance	and	rotation.	Analysis	73:	682–685.	Schilpp,	Paul	Arthur,	ed.	1963.	The	philosophy	of	Rudolf	Carnap,	The	Library	of	Living	Philosophers	Vol.	XI.	Chicago:	Open	Court.	
 28 
Shimony,	Abner.	1955.	Coherence	and	the	axioms	of	confirmation.	Journal	Of	Symbolic	Logic	20:	1–28.	Skyrms,	Brian.	1980.	Causal	necessity:	A	pragmatic	investigation	of	the	necessity	of	laws.	New	Haven	and	London:	Yale	University	Press.	Stalnaker,	Robert	C.	1970.	Probability	and	conditionals.	Philosophy	of	Science	37:	64–80.	Wenmackers,	Sylvia,	and	Leon	Horsten.	2013.	Fair	infinite	lotteries.	Synthese	190:	37–61.	Wenmackers,	Sylvia.	2011.	Philosophy	of	probability:	Foundations,	epistemology,	and	
computation.	Dissertation,	University	of	Groningen.	Williamson,	Timothy.	2007.	How	probable	is	an	infinite	sequence	of	heads?	Analysis	67:	173–180.	
